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ABSTRACT—Taboo words are defined and sanctioned by
institutions of power (e.g., religion, media), and prohibi-
tions are reiterated in child-rearing practices. Native
speakers acquire folk knowledge of taboo words, but it
lacks the complexity that psychological science requires for
an understanding of swearing. Misperceptions persist in
psychological science and in society at large about how
frequently people swear or what it means when they do.
Public recordings of taboowords establish the commonplace
occurrence of swearing (ubiquity), although frequency data
are not always appreciated in laboratory research. A set of
10 words that has remained stable over the past 20 years
accounts for 80% of public swearing. Swearing is positively
correlated with extraversion and Type A hostility but neg-
atively correlated with agreeableness, conscientiousness,
religiosity, and sexual anxiety. The uniquely human facility
for swearing evolved and persists because taboo words
can communicate emotion information (anger, frustration)
more readily than nontaboo words, allowing speakers to
achieve a variety of personal and social goals with them
(utility). A neuro-psycho-social framework is offered to
unify taboo word research. Suggestions for future research
are offered.
Years ago, Patrick (1901) asked two simple questions: Why do we
swear, and when we swear, why do we choose the words we do?
Since his time, a considerable amount of scholarship has accu-
mulated to address psychological aspects of swearing, but, lacking
a unifying framework, it is scattered across scientific disciplines
and throughout the subfields of psychology. Research is reviewed
here in an attempt to show that swearing is a rich emotional,
psychological, and sociocultural phenomenon with implications
for those studying language acquisition, child rearing, gender
differences, neuroscience, mental health, personality, person
perception, emotion, verbal abuse, and cross-cultural differences.
This review is organized around eight questions that are used
to pique psychologists’ interest in taboo words and to promote a
deeper understanding of them through future research:What are
taboo words andwhy do they exist?What motivates people to use
taboo words? How often do people say taboo words, and who says
them? What are the most frequently used taboo words? Does
psychological science acknowledge the significance of the
frequency of taboo word use? Is a folk knowledge of taboo words
sufficient for psychological science? How should psychological
science define language? Does psychological science even need
a theory of swearing?
WHATARETABOOWORDSANDWHYDOTHEYEXIST?
I use the terms taboo words or swear words interchangeably to
describe the lexicon of offensive emotional language. A taboo is
a ‘‘ban or inhibition resulting from social custom or aversion’’
(The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
2000). Taboo words are sanctioned or restricted on both insti-
tutional and individual levels under the assumption that some
harm will occur if a taboo word is spoken. The exact nature of
harm to befall the speaker, listener, or society has never been
entirely clear (Heins, 2007;McEnery, 2006). At the institutional
level, taboos on certain forms of speech arise from authorities
that have the power to restrict speech and can act as arbiters
of harmful speech—good examples are courts of law, religious
leaders, educators, and mass media managers. Authorities who
define taboo speech exercise their power to do so by policing and
punishing those who violate prohibitions.
We first internalize taboos at a personal level. Indeed, we learn
not to use them when we are punished by caregivers. Aversive
classical conditioning is probably how words acquire their
taboo status and arousing autonomic properties (Jay, 2003; Jay,
King, & Duncan, 2006; Staats & Staats, 1958). Surprisingly, no
one has clearly established how a child acquires word taboos.
Certainly no one is born with knowledge of taboo words. It is only
when we mature enough that we are aware of institutional
standards. We learn about taboos through the socialization
of speech practices, which creates an oral or folk knowledge
of swearing etiquette. Reports that swear words occur frequently
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in everyday speech are consistent with the argument (elaborated
in Jay & Janschewitz, 2008) that native speakers of any culture
learn when and with whom it is appropriate to use taboo words.
Taboos on language are ancient; profanity (secular irreverent
speech) and blasphemy (attacks on religion) have been pro-
scribed by religious authorities since Biblical times (Heins,
2007). More recently, 20th- and 21st-century legal decisions
created taboos on speech considered obscene or indecent and
speech that constitutes sexual harassment or discrimination.
Why certain acts or words are defined as taboo is not always
clear; for example, indecent speech (patently offensive sexual
and excretory references) is an ambiguous legal concept that is
misunderstood by the populace (Heins, 2007). One can offer
prototypical examples of these speech categories, but their
borders are ill defined, making it difficult to declare exhaus-
tively what is taboo in universal terms.
One can discover the variety of taboo words by consulting
reference works on slang or offensive speech (see Eble, 1996;
Jay, 2000; Montagu, 1967; Sagarin, 1962; Spears, 1981). Word
scaling and autonomic arousal studies also can successfully
differentiate taboo and nontaboo words (Janschewitz, 2008; Jay,
1992, 2000). On an institutional level, one also can examine
word taboos set by the media or schools (Jay, 1992). Another way
to find out more information about taboo words is to locate the
coprolalia (uncontrollable swearing) of Tourette’s syndrome (TS)
patients, who shout the most socially inappropriate words in
their language. American Touretters usually shout words such as
fuck or motherfucker but not poop (Jay, 2000). One can also
observe the presence of euphemisms, which replace taboo
counterparts. Euphemisms evidence the existence of problem-
atic references to sexuality, death, illness, body products, and
so forth in conversations (see Allan & Burridge, 1991). For
example, in polite company people say shoot or sugar instead
of shit. At present, we do not know if speakers achieve the same
level of emotional satisfaction when they substitute a euphe-
mism for a taboo word, nor do we know if euphemisms prime
their taboo counterparts, thus undermining the reason for using
them in the first place.
Although there are hundreds of taboo words and phrases, the
semantic range of referents that are considered taboo is limited
in scope. Taboos in English are placed primarily on sexual
references (blow job, cunt) and on those that are considered
profane or blasphemous (goddamn, Jesus Christ). Taboos extend
to scatological referents and disgusting objects (shit, crap, douche
bag); some animal names (bitch, pig, ass); ethnic–racial–gender
slurs (nigger, fag, dago); insulting references to perceived psy-
chological, physical, or social deviations (retard, wimp, lard ass);
ancestral allusions (son of a bitch, bastard); substandard vulgar
terms (fart face, on the rag); and offensive slang (cluster fuck, tit
run). For clarity it is helpful to qualify references to ‘‘taboo words’’
by noting what category of taboo they represent—for example,
sexual taboos, religious taboos, scatological taboos, etc.—espe-
cially in cases where references (or stimuli) are restricted to one or
two of these categories. New taboo words can emerge, especially in
slang (Eble, 1996). Taboo words range from the mildly offensive
(e.g., damn, fart) to the very offensive (e.g., cunt, nigger), as word-
scaling and autonomic-arousal studies have demonstrated (see
Janschewitz, 2008; Jay, 1992; Jay, Caldwell-Harris, &King, 2008;
Mabry, 1974).
Word offensiveness or appropriateness depends on contextual
variables, and our sensitivity to the context has been demonstrated
in numerous studies (e.g., Jay & Janschewitz, 2008; Mabry, 1974;
Wells, 1989).Wells (1989) asked college students to list the sexual
term (e.g., for oral–genital contact) they would use in different
contexts (e.g., with parent, lover, or in mixed company). Technical
terms were preferred for mixed crowds and with parents. Sexual
obscenities were reserved for same sex crowds and ‘‘withmy lover’’
contexts. There is also ample evidence that parents are uncom-
fortable with sex terms around children (Berges, Neiderbach,
Rubin, Sharpe, & Tesler, 1983; Jay et al., 2006).
Mabry (1974) asked subjects to rate a list of sexual terms to
determine how likely they would use such words in a conversation.
A factor analysis of the ratings produced five separate factors.
Two factors are clearly exemplified by taboo words; Mabry labeled
them sexual obscenities (cock, cunt) and personally defaming
words (bastard, bitch). The other three factors can be used in polite
company or mass media; they are technical expressions (penis,
vagina), latent sexual terms (behind, goose), and euphemistic
expressions (make love, go to bed). Mabry’s study points to the
difficulty we have with sex talk: we use slang, which seems too
offensive for polite conversation, but, on the other hand, clinical
terms seem odd and too formal.
The ultimate offensiveness of words is determined entirely by
pragmatic variables such as speaker–listener relationship and
social–physical setting, as well as the words used and tone of
voice (Jay & Janschewitz, 2007, 2008; Locher & Watts, 2005).
Seven-year-olds frequently say ‘‘fag’’ without sensing its inap-
propriateness the way an adult would. The lack of universal
standards for offensiveness due to contextual variability creates
problems for defining exactly what offensive or harmful speech
is. Verbal abuse research is plagued to define exactly what con-
stitutes abusive speech (O’Leary, 1999). In some cases it is clear
that obscenities and insults are abusive; but in addition, so are
comments that do not include taboo words (e.g.,What’s wrong with
you?). There is obvious overlap between taboo words and abusive
speech, but they are not the same.Our sense of offensiveness tends
to increase as we mature; what is offensive to children is not
necessarily offensive to adults.Young boys findwords such as baby
or wimp more offensive than do their parents (Jay & Janschewitz,
2005). The chore for the language learner is to determine what
words are appropriate for a given social setting.
How are we able to talk about sex, body parts, or gender
differences if those topics are taboo? Languages have different
speech styles or standards to synchronize word choice with the
given level of formality (Jay, 2003). Speech styles, like clothing
styles, range from the casual (e.g., slang in the locker room) to
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the formal (e.g., courtroom discourse, conference presentation).
Although we talk about sex in many contexts, we have to be cau-
tious about the words we choose to use. Taboo words (e.g., dick)
in particular are regarded as too repugnant for formal speech,
and slang is by definition informal, but clinical sexual refer-
ences (e.g., penis) are acceptable in formal speech.
WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO USE TABOO WORDS?
Reasons for using or not using taboo words depend on the con-
versational goals of the speaker. Swearing is like using the horn
on your car, which can be used to signify a number of emotions
(e.g., anger, frustration, joy, surprise). Our control over swearing
ranges from the spontaneous forms (e.g., habitual epithets), over
which we seem to have little control, to the reflective forms (e.g.,
new obscene joke), where we take time to think about what to say
(Van Lancker, 1987). Taboo words can be used to achieve a vari-
ety of personal and interpersonal outcomes that may be positive,
negative, or inconsequential in terms of their impact on others,
although somemight argue all uses of taboo words are harmful to
some degree. We do more than just say swear words; there are
specific categories of use that fall under the rubric of swearing
(see Jay, 1992, 2000; McEnery, 2006; Montagu, 1967; Sagarin,
1962). Besides literal or denotative uses (We fucked), the pri-
mary use of swearing is for emotional connotation, which occurs
in the form of epithets or as insults directed toward others.
Epithets are offensive emotional outbursts of single words or
phrases used to express the speaker’s frustration, anger, or surprise
(Holy shit! Fuck me!). Two-thirds of our swearing data are linked to
personal and interpersonal expressions of anger and frustration,
which seem to be the main reason for swearing (Jay, 1992, 2000).
Insulting forms of taboo word use include name calling and put
downs (asshole, bitch) and cursing or wishing harm on someone
(e.g., fuck off, eat shit and die). Taboo words are a defining feature
of sexual harassment, blasphemy, obscene phone calls, discrimi-
nation, hate speech and verbal abuse categories.
Positive social outcomes are achieved by using taboo words
in jokes and humor, social commentary, sex talk, storytelling,
in-group slang, and self-deprecation or ironic sarcasm in order
to promote social harmony or cohesion (also see Clark, 1996;
Jay, 2000; Zoglin, 2008). A positive outcome is also achieved
when a speaker replaces physical violence with speech or feels a
sense of relief or catharsis after swearing, although there is scant
evidence to verify this (Jay et al., 2006). As for inconsequential
outcomes, researchers have often overlooked the fact that many
episodes of taboo word use are casual conversational habits
(e.g., This CD is fucking great) in the absence of any clear social
motive other than fitting in with others’ informal use of taboo
words. This casual use of taboo words, which may not be intended
to be offensive, can still be regarded as impolite or offensive by
bystanders.
The taboo lexicon is like a box of tools engineered for a wide
range of emotional expression. This is what is meant by their
utility: one can achieve a myriad of personal and social goals
with them. From an evolutionary standpoint, swearing is a un-
ique human behavior that developed for a purpose. Taboo words
persist because they can intensify emotional communication to a
degree that nontaboo words cannot (Jay & Janschewitz, 2007;
Potts, 2007).Fuck you! immediately conveys a level of contempt
unparalleled by nontaboo words; there is no way to convey Fuck
you! with polite speech (Jay & Janschewitz, 2007). The emo-
tional impact of taboo words produces a unique high level of
arousal unlike other nontaboo emotional words (Jay et al., 2008;
Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; LaBar & Phelps, 1998).
HOW OFTEN DO PEOPLE SAY TABOO WORDS AND
WHO SAYS THEM?
I used the word ubiquity in my title to point to two features of
taboo words that are worthy of more attention. Curse words are
used persistently over a person’s lifetime and are frequently
uttered in public. The term persistence here refers to the fact that
we say taboo words as soon as we speak and we continue to swear
into old age even through dementia and senile decline (Jay, 1992,
1996a, 2000). Taboo speech persists through brain dysfunction
for aphasics andAlzheimer’s patients who forget the names of their
family members but still remember how to swear, or they ‘‘mys-
teriously’’ begin swearing in cognitive decline when before they
did not. Paul Broca’s famous aphasic patient, Leborgne, lost his
facility for fluent speech but his swearing did persist. Neuro-
scientists over the years have gone to great lengths to explain
the language functions Leborgne lost but not why his swearing
persisted through brain damage (Jay, 2000, 2003). Swear words
persist through parents’ attempts to eliminate them as parental
sanctions have virtually no effect on swearing rates when children
reach adulthood (Berges et al., 1983; Jay et al., 2006).
Field studies of swearing have provided consistent estimates
for frequency of using taboo words. Jay (1980a) found 70 swear
words in an 11,609-word tape-recorded sample of conversation
or a rate of 0.7% of the corpus. More recently, a British spoken
word corpus showed that swear words occurred at a 0.3% to
0.5% rate (McEnery, 2006). Similarly, using an electronically
activated recorder, Mehl and Pennebaker (2003) found a 0.5%
taboo word rate over a 2-day period. The rate of swearing was
consistent over the recording sessions for individual speakers
(r 5 .86). Substantial individual differences were also found:
taboo word rates varied from a minimum of 0% per day to a
maximum of 3.4% per day. In regard to swearing on the Internet,
Thelwall (2008) reported a .2% swear word rate inMySpace, and
Subrahmanyam, Smahel, and Greenfield (2006) reported that
3% of chat room utterances contained obscene words (1 obscen-
ity every 2 min). Recent work by Mehl and colleagues (Mehl,
Vazire, Ramirez-Esparza, Statcher, & Pennebaker, 2007) deter-
mined that the average speaker uses 15,000–16,000 words per
day. Estimating spoken word rates using the figures mentioned
above (0.5% to 0.7%) suggests that speakers utter 80–90 taboo
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words per day. To further support the argument that taboo words
are common, we can benchmark them against the base rate of
other common nontaboo words: Mehl and Pennebaker (2003)
found first person plural pronouns (we, us, our) occurred at
a 1.0% rate. Language researchers do not regard personal
pronouns as low-frequency words.
As for who swears, that depends on one’s group identity and
personality factors. Swearing has been documented in the lexica
of many social groups: soldiers, police, high school and college
students, drug users, athletes, laborers, juvenile delinquents,
psychiatric patients, and prisoners; although production rates
are unknown (see Jay, 1992, 2000). One’s social rank plays a role
in swearing; McEnery (2006) found socially low-ranking speakers
produced higher rates of swearing than did high-ranking speakers.
An individual’s personality also plays a significant role in fre-
quency of taboo word use; hostility, sexual anxiety and religiosity
loompreeminent. Hostile swearing is a defining feature of the Type
A personality. In contrast, swearing is not prevalent in populations
characterized by high religiosity, sexual anxiety, or sexual re-
pressiveness (Janschewitz, 2008; Jay, 1992, 2000). Mormons and
other religious affiliates opt out of swearing altogether and turn to
euphemisms instead (see Jay, 2005). According to Mehl, Gosling,
and Pennebaker (2006) swearing is negatively correlated with
high scores on the Big Five personality factors of agreeableness
and conscientiousness. Recently, Fast and Funder (2008) found
that people who swore most frequently in life-history interviews
were generally described as more extraverted, dominant, and so-
cially negative. Their research complements Mehl et al. (2006) in
that people who swear more are clearly lower in agreeableness and
higher in extraversion. In contrast to Mehl et al. (2006), Fast and
Funder found no strong negative correlation with conscientious-
ness: females’ swearing was only slightly negatively correlated
with it (r5 .12), and males’ swearing was correlated with neu-
roticism (r5 .20).
WHAT ARE THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED TABOO
WORDS?
A summary of our studies conducted in 1986, 1997, and 2006
indicates that public taboo word episodes rely on a small set
of words that are repeated often (see Jay, 1992, 2000; Jay &
Janschewitz, 2008, for details). This conclusion extends beyond
previous reports that were based on a single count from one
specific time and place (e.g., Cameron, 1969, 1970). By looking
at 20 years of taboo word data we can see what has changed and
what has remained stable.
Though over 70 different taboo words types were publicly
recorded, most taboo word use involves 10 frequently used terms
(fuck, shit, hell, damn, goddamn, Jesus Christ, ass, oh my god,
bitch, and sucks), which account for roughly 80% of the data. In
fact fuck and shit alone amount to one third to one half of all the
episodes in counts between 1986 and 2006. The top 10 words
are essentially the same set found in 1986, 1997, and 2006,
drawing mainly on sexual obscenity and profanity. Further,
highly offensive words (cunt, cocksucker, nigger) occur relatively
infrequently in public over the time period. The report of a stable
lexicon over the years contrasts with a misperception that the
most frequent swear words are in constant flux.
Both speaker gender and age affect word choice and frequency;
men swear more frequently in public than women (also see Jay,
1980b, 1996a; McEnery, 2006; Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003;
Thelwall, 2008). Men accounted for 67% of public swearing epi-
sodes in 1986, but the gap narrowed to 55% by 2006. Men say
more offensive words (e.g., fuck, shit, motherfucker) more fre-
quently than women do. Women say oh my god, bitch, piss, and
retard(ed) more frequently than men do. In fact the mild expletive
oh my god accounted for 24% of the women’s 2006 data and
women were five times more likely than men to say it. Men and
women swear more frequently in the presence of their own gender
than in mixed-gender contexts. As for age, swearing occurs across
all age ranges, but swearing rates peak in the teenage years and
decline thereafter (Jay, 1992; Thelwall, 2008).
DOES PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE ACKNOWLEDGE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREQUENCY OF TABOO
WORD USE?
The short answer here is not enough. Laboratory studies have so
far produced contradictory views of taboo word frequency. In
order to move forward in research with taboo word use, we need
to be adequately informed about taboo word frequency because
word frequency is a powerful predictor of ease of processing in a
number of language tasks (Jay, 2003). Looking back to Elliot
McGinnies’ (1949) classic study of perceptual defense, partici-
pants were subliminally (tachistscopically) presented with taboo
and nontaboo words. The duration of presentation was increased
over trials until participants were able to recognize each word.
McGinnies found taboo words required longer exposure times
to be recognized than did nontaboo words. Jerome Bruner (in
McGinnies, 1949) suggested that longer exposure times were
necessary because participants were unfamiliar with taboo words,
due to the words’ infrequent occurrence in print material.
McGinnies argued the opposite, stating that taboo words were
‘‘quite common in conversational usage’’ (p. 250). In a reply to
McGinnies, Howes, and Solomon (1950) emphatically agreed with
Bruner’s position:
Horrified, we insist that Professor McGinnies speak for himself.
Commonmorality, even if plain observation were to fail, constrains
us to believe that his neutral words better characterize the con-
versations of at least his collegiate subjects. We certainly can
assure him that our own conversations are spiced only very rarely
indeed by such delicacies of expression. (p. 230)
Onemight attribute this quaint genteelism about taboo speech
to 1950s-era prudery were it not for the persistence of inaccurate
estimates of the frequency of swearing.
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Williams and Evans (1980) used a lexical decision task to
replicate McGinnies’ findings, assuming their taboo stimuli
occurred infrequently in word counts based on written fre-
quency (e.g., Kucera & Francis, 1967). They noted as follows:
‘‘Several of the stimulus items were not listed in word counts, but
their written frequency should be low’’ (p. 196). This low fre-
quency assumption is repeated in recent neuroscience research
involving emotional word processing. LaBar and Phelps (1998)
wrote, ‘‘it is assumed that taboo words are of relatively low fre-
quency of occurrence in language (e.g., Williams & Evans,
1980)’’ (p. 490). It is interesting to note that when Sharot and
Phelps (2004) selected stimuli from LaBar and Phelps and had
subjects scale neutral and ‘‘arousing’’ words for familiarity, they
found no difference in familiarity scores as a function of word
type. More recently, in a study of memory for emotional words,
Kensinger and Corkin (2003) proposed low frequency as a
possible explanation for enhanced memory for taboo words: ‘‘. . .
it remained possible that memory benefit for the taboo words, as
compared with the negative and neutral words, resulted from the
fact that taboo words had a lower word frequency’’ (p. 1176). But
we know now that taboo words are not low-frequency words.
A major problem in research concerning taboo words is the
use of frequency estimates that are based on written frequency
counts. The common supposition that taboo words are low fre-
quency ‘‘in language’’ relies on the conflation of written and
spoken estimates. Written frequency estimates grossly under-
estimate the use of taboo words in a language because they do
not take into account the frequency of swearing in everyday
conversations as well as more demonstrative forms (Jay, 1977,
1980a). We argue here, along with McGinnies (1949), that taboo
words are common in young adults’ lexica (Janschewitz, 2008;
Jay, 2000; Jay et al., 2008; Jay & Janschewitz, 2008). The
misperception of categorical low frequency of use leads inves-
tigators to erroneously choose low-frequency words as controls
or foils in experiments. We do not intend to suggest that the
results of recent emotion research using taboo words are invalid.
Conclusions based on the more salient quality of arousal elicited
by taboo words should be powerful enough to be only slightly
influenced by erroneous assumptions about word frequency;
misperceptions about frequency do not undermine the words’
emotional impact (see Jay et al., 2008). Researchers can obtain
sufficient estimates of word use by norming their stimuli in
pretesting studies, but they should not rely on their potentially
erroneous impressions of how frequently taboo words occur.
IS A FOLK KNOWLEDGE OF TABOO WORDS
SUFFICIENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE?
The short answer to the question is ‘‘no,’’ as we find that folk
knowledge of taboo words, what we learn about them from par-
ents and peers, can be flawed. People have an abiding interest
in swearing because we grew up in a culture where we quickly
learned that swear words are the words we have to know, but we
cannot say them. This is the starting point of folk knowledge of
taboo words: some words are taboo and some are not.We also learn
that taboo words are not equal—they represent different levels of
emotion: Fuck you! represents a greater level of anger than crap!
As we become more socially aware we learn the third aspect of
taboo words: We can say a word in one context but not others. Eat
shit! is acceptable,maybe even expected, in a locker room, but it is
impolite at the dinner table. It takes time for nonnatives to learn a
native’s level of knowledge, for example, nonnatives can know that
shit is offensive, but they may not know when and where to say it
(Jay & Janschewitz, 2008; Thomas, 1983).
We knowwhat taboo words are; however, this does not render a
psychological science that takes in a full account of swearing. A
superficial understanding of taboo words is in part due to mis-
representations of the swearing in the media. Although there is
persistent interest in the media regarding the public use of taboo
words (e.g., Angier, 2005; Ungaro, 1997), in many cases, media
analyses serve to perpetuate myths about swearing, such as the
myth that only undereducated speakers swear. Swearing crosses
all socioeconomic classes (Jay, 2000; McEnery, 2006). The
negative framing of swearing reinforces the notion of taboo
words as substandard speech and is used by authority figures
to relegate swearing to bad behavior that cannot be condoned
(O’Connor, 2000). Media ignore situations where swearing is
beneficial, such as when it is cathartic or a useful substitute
for physical violence (see Jackson, 1866/1958). A negative
dismissive attitude toward swearing is in part responsible for
why mainstream psychology has ignored swearing as a research
topic. To counter some of the myths and misperceptions about
taboo words, psychological science needs to shed more light on
the dark side of language; however, a comprehensive analysis of
swearing will necessitate a reformulation of what language is.
HOW SHOULD PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE DEFINE
LANGUAGE?
When scholars disregard or dismiss swearing as irrelevant to a
complete understanding of language, we are left with a polite or
sanitized and therefore false science of language. The entirety of
humanity, the angry, hateful, or enticing emotional expressions
all languages contain are ignored (Jay & Janschewitz, 2007;
Potts, 2007). As if offensive emotions played no role in language,
Pinker (1994, p. 334) asserted that swearing is not ‘‘genuine
language’’ because it is the product of subcortical brain activity.
Pinker’s emotional versus nonemotional dichotomy is false be-
cause languages produce a wide range of emotional expressions.
Unfortunately, psycholinguists in the past drew heavily from
Chomsky’s (1957) structuralist theory of language (‘‘What are
the rules that generate sentences?’’), which does not address
emotion in language at all. A functionalist approach (‘‘Why do
people speak to each other?’’) avoids the ‘‘emotion gap’’ of
structuralism by addressing emotional and social uses of speech
(Clark, 1996; Jay, 2000, 2003; Jay & Janschewitz, 2007; Potts,
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2007). A similar problematic situation arose with P. Brown and
Levinson’s (1987) influential definition of ‘‘politeness theory,’’
which was predicated on the false assumption that politeness is
culturally normative and ignored the frequent purposeful use of
offensive language to achieve social goals in arguments, court
room discourse, and political debates (see Culpeper, 1996). The
original politeness theory turned out to be too polite at the
expense of a more accurate analysis and understanding of the
goals and purposes of rude, offensive, and impolite language.
Conventional conceptualizations of language (R. Brown,
1965; Clark & Clark, 1977; Hockett, 1960) need to be expanded
to capture how words communicate emotion. Emotion informa-
tion is produced and understood through word choice, emphasis
or stress, and speech volume (Jay, 2003). Understanding a
speaker’s emotional state by what is said and how it is said is an
essential part of our everyday emotional intelligence, and is a
sense that can be lost through brain damage, such as when some
patients with amygdalar damage lose the ability to project or
detect emotion in speech (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999).
Most natural language processors and semantic network models
ignore taboo words entirely, except WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998).
If natural language processors are to simulate the full range of
human language functions, then they need to acknowledge the
function of swearing. Bower (1981) anticipated the need to un-
derstand the role of emotion in models of language and semantic
memory. He argued that the emotional aspects of words are an
inherent part of their semantic meanings and that the emotional
context for a word’s use is stored along with its semantic and
syntactic properties. Our informants bolster Bower’s argument,
as they can recount vivid details of beingpunished for saying taboo
words (Jay et al., 2006). In contrast, because the contexts are not as
arousing or provocative as they are for taboo words, most people
have no emotional memory of learning nontaboo words.
Once we have a semantic network that includes emotion infor-
mation at the lexical level, we can use emotion as a basis for lexical
access during the swearing process (see Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer,
2000). Words are tagged with information regarding their arousal
level, offensiveness, and appropriateness (see Jay, 2003; Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Staats & Staats, 1958).The speaker
uses emotion tags during lexical access to choose offensive or
inoffensive words. A male patient chooses penis instead of dick
when he tells his physician ‘‘I was bit on the penis by a tick,’’
though he would likely tell his buddies over a beer that he was ‘‘bit
on the dick.’’ The syntax and semantics remain the same in the
utterance, only the emotional nuances change.
Speech production models have not incorporated tabooness as
an aspect of lexical selection, but semantic network models
could do this, with modifications. Multiple Code Theory (MCT;
Bucci, 2000; Bucci & Freedman, 1978) already has an emo-
tional level, and Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT; Anderson,
1996) could accommodate emotion words into its multiple levels
framework. The power of MCT comes from melding parallel-
distributed processing (Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989) with
emotion insights from modern psychoanalytic theory. MCT
proposes that information in the human mind exists in both
verbal and multiple nonverbal channels. Verbal code is domi-
nant in the conscious processes that are used to regulate and
direct ourselves. It can activate imagery, emotions, and actions
such as cringing when we hear disgusting words. Similarly,
Anderson’s (1996) ACT model of semantic memory includes
knowledge networks made up of propositional, imaging, spatial,
and temporal information about actions, events, general seman-
tics, and personal information. If ACT can learn to perform
procedures such as adding numbers, it can learn to swear (see Jay,
2003, for a more detailed analysis).
DOES PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE EVEN NEED A
THEORY OF SWEARING?
Psychology would profit from a unifying theory that can capture
both universal and idiosyncratic aspects of swearing. The theory
needs to acknowledge that we have similar nervous systems for
emotional expression, but different personalities, learning his-
tories, and cultural constraints. The neuro-psycho-social (NPS)
model of swearing (Jay, 2000) is one such comprehensive
framework that specifies the conditions under which swearing
is likely to occur based on a speaker’s neurological state (e.g.,
autonomic arousal), psychological status (e.g., agreeableness),
and social sensitivity (e.g., impoliteness). All episodes of
swearing originate in a nexus of NPS conditions: a nervous
system in a person in a cultural context. The NPS conditions are
interdependent as one can see by looking at TS (Morris, 1993).
One might assume all Touretters have the ‘‘same’’ disorder, but if
this is the case, why are their obscene words and gestures cul-
turally specific? For example, a Japanese Touretter is likely to
yell ancestral allusions (shit grandma!) because irreverent
references to ancestors are extremely taboo in Japan. In contrast,
Danish Touretters rarely yell ancestral allusions. American
Touretters flip the middle finger, but Kuwaiti Touretters do not.
TS manifests itself in terms of speech and gesture depending on
where its victims were reared (Jay, 2000).
The NPS model is a series of 24 postulates tested for truth
value (see Wyer & Collins, 1992). Postulate 2.10, for example,
states the following: Propositional cursing obeys semantic and
syntactic rules, since swearing is rule-bound, not chaotic or
random. To test the model, the next step is to search for evidence
that would invalidate 2.10. If no counter evidence is found, then
the postulate is assumed to be true, and no counter evidence has
been found for 2.10—for example, no one talks like the popular
hyperbole, ‘‘every other word was a swear word’’ (take a long
sentence and insert a swear word every other word and you can
see what I mean). Native speakers do not say sentences like ‘‘My
suitcase is a whore’’ or ‘‘Our corpses were fucking’’ because
these do not make sense. ‘‘I have to shitting’’ is not produced
because it is not grammatical. Native speakers’ utterances col-
lected so far do not contain semantic or syntactic violations like
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those in the examples (see Jay, 1992, 2000). It would be infor-
mative to analyze nonnatives’ taboo word errors before they ac-
quire competence in English, as errors should show what forms
of swearing are easier to learn than others.
NPS can predict the probability of using a taboo word deno-
tatively (literally) versus connotatively (emotionally) based
on semantic use weights (Jay, 1992). For example, if a speaker is
going to say asshole, the probability of using it connotatively in
reference to a thoughtless person is .92, whereas the probability
of using asshole denotatively to refer to the anal sphincter is only
.03. Piss(ed) is used more equivocally: half of the references
denote urination (I have to take a piss) and the rest connote anger
(Don’t piss me off). Ultimately, NPS aims to predict the likelihood
of taboo speech, which is accomplished through conditional (if,
then) statements that take the following general form:
IF N state 1 P state 1 S context, THEN the speaker will say X.
Rigorous tests of NPS remain to be conducted; however, NPS
would predict that swearing is highly likely from a Type A adult
in a stressful social situation but not from an introverted religious
child under the eye of her teacher. Brain dysfunction (TS, aphasia,
amygdalar damage) can override normal psychological and social
conditions; frontal lobe damage can increase swearing (e.g., Phi-
neas Gage), but damage to the amygdala can decrease swearing.
Recent research on angry exchanges and on native versus
bilingual differences has been supportive (Bousfield, 2007; Jay
& Janschewitz, 2008). For angry swearing, NPS seeks answers
to basic questions: What is the connection between anger and
swearing? What is the cause? The consequence? Who is the
victim? Angry swearing should unfold in a stagelike fashion
from a provoking event and level of felt anger to retaliatative
swearing (see Averill, 1983; Jay, 2000). Bousfield (2007) ex-
amined the triggering, progression, and resolution of spoken
exchanges that contain offensive speech between a London chef
and the workers in his busy kitchen and between a military drill
sergeant and his new recruits. From the onset, one sees how the
provoking events effect the swearing that ensues. For example,
when the chef notices that his helper has delayed an urgently
needed dish, he rants, ‘‘What’s going on here you . . . what is
going on about fucking foie gras, eh you arsehole—why don’t
you go fuck off home’’ (p. 2199). The helper meekly replies, ‘‘I
don’t want to,’’ to the angry chef. In the military example, when
the drill sergeant notices a new recruit performing poorly at drill,
he reacts with sarcasm and obscenity by saying, ‘‘Hey, are you on
a fucking Sunday outing are you, eh?’’ (p. 2192). In both cases
the superiors are provoked by their underlings’ poor perfor-
mance, and the swearing reflects the superiors’ felt anger. The
subordinates are not in a position to retaliate, fearing further
verbal abuse or punishment. Bousfield uses NPS to analyze a
number of exchanges like this, noting what triggered the event,
how the speaker responded, and what transpired after that.
Another success for NPS has been the accurate prediction of
differences between native and bilingual English speakers in
terms of their awareness of swearing etiquette in the English. Jay
and Janschewitz (2008) found that native speakers are more
sensitive than bilinguals to how differences in speaker status
and differences in taboo word choice affect overall offensiveness
of taboo expressions (also see Jay, 1992).
NPS would be more useful when fully integrated into theories
of language. Efforts have been underway to do this using MCT-
like representations to link affect to word meaning. Jay (2003)
outlined how general semantic models can be expanded to in-
clude emotion words and can account for phenomena such as
taboo word associations (also see Jung, 1910). At present, NPS
stands more as a starting point for understanding the vicissi-
tudes of swearing than as a finished theory of swearing. One goal
here is to use this review to spur future research.
WHAT WORK LIES AHEAD?
The ubiquity of taboo words throughout the lifespan, across all
known languages, demands a reformulation of theories of human
language toward a more central role for taboo speech. Critical
areas for future research concern children’s acquisition of swear-
ing, and a focus on determining a more scientific account of the
positive and negative psychosocial effects of swearing. There
remain a number of issues to be addressed by psychological
science—for example, swearing occurs frequently in college
communities (Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003; Mehl et al., 2007), but
future research must sample younger speakers and more diverse
communities and ethnic groups (seeMosby,Rawls,Meehan,Mays,
& Pettinari, 1999; White, 2002).
The fact that Americans swear frequently is no trivial matter;
swearing results in significant problems at home, in public
schools, in the workplace, and in electronic media (Baruch
& Jenkins, 2006; Daro & Gelles, 1992; Deffenbacher, White, &
Lynch, 2004; Fox Television v. FCC, 2007; Heins, 2007; Jay,
1996b, 2000; Martell & Sullivan, 1994). Legal scholarship on
verbal sexual harassment, indecent speech, road rage, or verbal
abuse would benefit from psychologists’ insights about what
speech is acceptable and what is not. Research on anger man-
agement and prejudice can help us better understand the cause
of verbal abuse or sexual harassment and can encourage efforts
to ameliorate these problems—for example, children will be
better served if their parents helped them cope with anger and
not focus so much on punishing them for swearing.
The neuroscience of swearing awaits more work (see Hagoort,
2008). Several issues need definitive answers. Why do some
Touretters swear and others do not? Do monolinguals and bilin-
guals process taboo words similarly? How did we evolve the ca-
pability to swear in the first place? Are there analogous mecha-
nisms in subhuman primates? Could event-related potentials
measuring semantic and syntactic word anomalies (Hagoort, 2008;
Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) be used to support Proposition 2.10?
What happens during catharsis; do swear words provide more
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relief than euphemisms? Can swearing alleviate acute or chronic
pain? Does swearing interfere with executive control? If words
harm people, how do we measure harm?
On the psychological level there is more work to be done iden-
tifying additional dimensions of personality related to swearing.
Swearingmay be viewed as a beneficial copingmechanism, but is
there an interpersonal cost in terms of person perception in terms
of speaker credibility, persuasion, or prejudice? Do men and
women differ in their coping by swearing? Why do gender
differences in swearing emerge?Are gender differences related to
physical aggression? How harmful are ethnic-racial slurs relative
to other discriminatory behavior? Can prejudice be explored with
implicit attitude testing using taboo words? Is Internet swearing
more or less potent than face-to-face swearing? How do dirty
jokes and storytelling create a sense of cohesion? In what situa-
tions are people rewarded for being good swearers?
On a cultural level, psychologists who study human commu-
nication are in a position to contribute significantly to important
debates regarding Americans’ sensitivity to sexual language.
Opinions from providers of healthcare, education, and coun-
seling could help us understand how adolescents benefit from
talking about sex (Heins, 2007). Psychological science can also
help establish objective standards to define parameters for
censoring speech in electronic media by showing what words
harm people, which then will have implications for child rear-
ing. We also need a better understanding of what kind of speech
is educational and what kind is harmful in teen chat rooms,
Blogs, and social networks (MySpace). Research and conclu-
sions will be valuable when they are drawn from a combination
of naturally observed public behavior in conjunction with lab-
oratory-based studies of those behaviors. This need to bolster
self-report data with observations of actual behavior has been
recently championed by Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2007).
In the end, we seek more answers to questions regarding why we
use taboo words and what it means when we do.
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